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We explore the impact of strategic assessment efforts on military organizations at war. To do so, 
we construct a model to explore the impact of a principal’s choice among imperfect performance 
metrics for a military operation. In doing so, the principal must consider both the incentivizing 
and informational properties of the metric. We show the conditions under which uncertainty 
regarding the nature of the agent, as well as uncertainty regarding the operational environment, 
drives a metric choice that induces pathological behavior from the agent. More specifically, a 
poor metric choice can create an overly optimistic assessment and end up prolonging the conflict. 










Assessing progress in war is always a difficult endeavor (Gartner 1997), but as 
Campbell, O’Hanlon, and Shapiro (2009: 16) argue: “counterinsurgency and stabilization 
operations --- like the ones in Iraq and Afghanistan --- are different, and more complex... 
How do we measure progress in such situations? This question is crucially important. 
Only by tracking progress can we know whether a strategy is working.” Such relevant 
information may include the status of enemy forces, the performance of one’s own 
forces, the local civilian population, and similar factors. The implication is that, with 
better assessments of the conflict, efforts of the military can be more efficiently utilized 
and victory will be more likely.      
Many critics of current war efforts have complained that the measurement 
problem stems fundamentally from a lack of information regarding the operational 
environment. The conclusion of one analysis of the military intelligence efforts of the war 
in Afghanistan, for example, is damning on this topic:   
 
Eight years into the war in Afghanistan... the vast intelligence apparatus is unable 
to answer fundamental questions about the environment... Ignorant of local 
economics and landowners, hazy about who the powerbrokers are and how they 
might be influenced, incurious about the correlations between various 
development projects and the levels of cooperation among villagers, and 
disengaged from the people in the best position to find answers... US intelligence 
officers and analysts can do little but shrug... (Flynn et al. 2010: 7).       
 
In contrast to such pleas for more emphasis on the informational content of 
wartime measurement, however, we engage an under-explored ramification of the 
assessment problem, namely the impact of the selected metrics on the incentives of the 
military agent. In doing so, we examine an aspect of metrics that has been almost entirely 
neglected in the current policy debates: the manner in which one measures progress 
incentivizes the behavior of those who are conducting the war.      
In his classic article, “On the Folly of Rewarding A, While hoping for B,” Steven 
Kerr (1975) introduced this problem in the wartime setting. He did so by recognizing that 
incentives matter even in motivating soldiers on the battlefield. In the Second World War 
the fact that personnel were drafted for the duration of the conflict motivated soldiers 
very differently than in case of Vietnam, in which soldiers were drafted for one-year 
tours of duty. Kerr explains how incentives were aligned in the Second World War.   
 
What did the GI in World War II want? To go home. And when did he get to go 
home? When the war was won! If he disobeyed the orders to clean out trenches 
and take the hills, the war would not be won and he would not go home (1975: 
771).       
 
Kerr contrasts this with the incentives in the Vietnam conflict.   
 
Consider the reward system in Vietnam. What did the soldier at the bottom want? 
To go home. And when did he get to go home? When his tour of duty was over! 
This was the case whether or not the war was won (1975: 771). 
 
The important contribution of his work is two-fold: First, it points to the problem 
of incentive alignment as fundamental in military operations. Second, it makes clear that 
the structure of a particular conflict and the contracting of the soldiers can dictate war 
outcomes. We take Kerr’s insights and apply them to a formal treatment of the metric 
selection problem. We consider the possibility that the structure of the conflict and 
military contracting can be such that incentives between the principal and agent are 
aligned or misaligned; the key point we make is that the measurement problem is starkly 
different in the two settings.      
To show this, we construct a principal-agent model with imperfect measurement 
of success and assumptions particular to the military context.1 The principal is unable to 
observe (ex ante or ex post) actual operational effectiveness. Instead the principal must 
use an imperfect performance measure (or metric) to assess information about the current 
conflict. We consider two types of agents. The first type has incentives that are aligned 
with the principal’s and consequently its behavior does not respond to the metric. The 
second type of agent has misaligned incentives and looks to maximize the metric instead 
of actual operational success. In this case, the metric incentivizes the agent to choose its 
actions in a particular direction. We find that the informational content and incentive 
properties of a metric are dependent on different features of a metric. Information is 
based on the realizations of the metric, while the incentives are based on marginal 
properties; how the agent’s actions change the metric. Consequently, a measure that 
provides perfect information can create highly distorted incentives, while a measure that 
gives excellent incentives can yield very little information. Because of this separation of 
the information and incentive properties of a metric, we simplify the metric choice 
problem into a choice of investment of resources into information or incentives. We show 
that the information about the agent type will dictate the principal’s relative investment 
into information and incentives properties of the performance measure. More specifically, 
if the principal knows that the agent is of the ‘World War II type’ (using Kerr’s 
examples), then it is optimal to invest all resources into information. Alternatively, 
knowledge of a ‘Vietnam type’ agent should result in a metric that equalizes the marginal 
value of information to the marginal value of incentives. We also, show that if the agent 
is of the ‘Vietnam type’ and the principal does not know this for sure, then the principal 
will believe it is closer to achieving its goals than is actually the case.      
We develop the argument through the following steps. In the next section we 
discuss the application of principal-agent models and show how we adapt the general 
framework to fit the special case of military bureaucracies. Next we develop a formal 
model of military principal-agent interaction with imperfect measurement. We then 
illustrate the insights of the model through a brief contrast of the Second World War and 
the Vietnam War. We show that in the case of the Second World War, the agent had 
aligned incentives with the principal, the principal knew this to be the case, and it was 
well understood how the agent’s actions impacted the wartime environment. This allowed 
for the simple choice of metrics that emphasized informational content. In the case of the 
Vietnam War, however, the principal was uncertain of the agent's incentives, and the 
impact of the agent’s actions on the wartime environment was poorly understood. This 
resulted in poor metric selection and the inducement of pathological agent behavior.      
In the final section we generate and explore policy implications for the ongoing 
conflict in Afghanistan. More specifically, we argue two things. First, that the incentives 
aspect of metrics has entirely been neglected; debate has uniformly focused on the 
improving the informational aspect of measurement. We show that this is a mistake. 
Second, the underlying cause of the metrics problem can be traced to a fundamental 
inability of the political-military leadership to articulate how military activity affects the 
Afghan operational environment. Until these issues are confronted, we predict a 
continued struggle for ‘good’ metrics in the conflict.   
 
MILITARY AGENTS AND THEIR OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT       
Before presenting the model, we describe the unique characteristics of the military 
agent and its relationship to its political principal. This is important, because the vast 
majority of principal-agent modeling has been done in the realm of profit-motivated firms 
and agents. We deviate from this standard principal-agent arrangement to better address 
the problem of professional soldiers. Bureaucracies are large, complex organizations who 
operate at the behest of a political principal. Due to these characteristics, formal 
principal-agent models have been increasingly used to model the interaction between 
political authorities and bureaucratic agents, which has contributed significantly to our 
understanding of these dynamics (see, for example, Calvert et al. 1989). Principal-agent 
models have rarely, however, been specifically crafted to deal with the nuances of the 
uniformed military services (one notable exception is Feaver 2005). Principal-agent 
models are especially attractive for modeling military bureaucracies in wartime 
environments in ways that have been hitherto neglected. In particular is the fact that 
political leaders' goals in wartime (such as ‘establish regional hegemony’ or ‘stabilization 
of a failed state’) often cannot be directly observed or contracted; rather, the principal 
must establish ‘observable benchmarks’ upon which progress towards the political 
endstate is noted.2 We argue that these benchmark performance measures are analytically 
distinct from simple state-of-the-world information measures and we show the dangers of 
failing to parse out the relative effects of the two.      
First, we define the military ‘agent’ as the uniformed services utilized to conduct 
operations in theater.3 For example, current US military operations in Afghanistan are 
conducted under CENTCOM (Central Command - the regionally aligned combatant 
command). Conversely, we define the ‘principal’ as the military-political leadership 
apparatus. In the case of the United States, this would include the president and his senior 
advisors based in Washington DC.      
Second, we depart from more standard economic and bureaucratic principal-agent 
models in our assumptions about military institutions. The standard hidden action models 
are predicated on the notion that agents prefer to ‘shirk than work’ - leveraging any 
asymmetric informational advantage to the most resources while putting in the minimum 
effort. This is what is commonly referred to as ‘information rent’ (Laffont and Martimort 
2002: Ch 2). In the context of a professional military agent in wartime, however, this 
work-shirk paradigm is not necessarily appropriate.4 As Huntington's classic work on 
civil-military relations argues, the structure of a professional military institution is 
designed to prevent such venality, and members are also socialized away from economic 
motivation: “the employment of his expertise promiscuously for his own advantage 
would wreck the fabric of society... Clearly [the agent] does not act primarily from 
economic motivations” (1957: 14-15).5 For this reason, we do not assume that the 
principal must be concerned with a military agent’s choice of how much to shirk based 
on compensation.6 We, rather, assume that the military institutions guarantee that the 
agent utilizes any assets given to it, and that the principal is concerned simply with the 
nature and direction of the actions employed by the agent to execute the task.7 We show 
that understanding how performance measurement impacts agent incentives is 
fundamental even without the work-shirk paradigm.8 The problem we study is still driven 
by the unavoidable information asymmetry; the agent has ‘man-on-the-spot’ information 
in the field to make decisions about the direction of his actions, while the principal 
possesses more contextual information about the conflict. The principal is concerned with 
aiming agent behavior in the best direction, which is accomplished with performance 
metrics.9  
There is a large literature on principal-agent relations beginning with Mitnick 
(1975).10 We build off the formal literature in employment relations starting with seminal 
contributions by Holmström (1979) and Grossman and Hart (1983). Our model is closely 
related to the conventional literature on agency problems of labor contracts with 
imperfect performance measures. Baker (1992), for example, studies the effect of 
imperfect performance measures on the optimal proportion of performance pay and fixed 
salary. It is shown that the percentage of the contract that is performance pay is 
increasing in the correlation between performance measure and the objective function. 
These results are fundamental for the understanding of labor contracting in the private 
firm setting. We adapt Baker’s model to the setting of military employment and focus on 
the trade-offs between informational content and incentives in performance metrics. The 
fundamental question Baker addresses is much less interesting in our context, since the 
optimal performance bonus is always arbitrarily small - such as medals, unit citations, 
promotions, or career assignments.11        
Finally, we clarify some terms before proceeding. First, we use the term ‘metrics’ 
inclusively to deal with task of assessment in wartime. This would include measures of 
‘performance,’ ‘progress,’ and ‘effect’ as well as military intelligence collection efforts 
(see Daddis 2011: 5-16, Connable 2012: 2-3). Second, we refer to the ‘operational 
environment’ in which the conflict takes place. This would include the relevant aspects of 
the battlespace in which the war is being fought, and may include the geographical, 
technological, diplomatic, social context in which the war takes place  (see Gray 1999: 
23-44). This would accord with the meaning of the more general term ‘state of the world’ 
used in developing the formal model. We now proceed to the model.   
 
THE MODEL       
There are two actors: a principal and an agent. The principal has an objective 
function 𝑣 𝑎,𝜔 , which is not observable in the contracting time by the principal. It is a 
function of a, the actions of the agent, and 𝜔, a vector of random variables that 
completely characterizes the state of the world. Denote by 𝑨 the set of possible actions 
and denote by Ω the set of all possible states of the world. The principal has probabilistic 
beliefs about the state of the world, which are specified by a probability measure 𝑓 on Ω.      
To help illustrate the range of choice in the set of actions 𝑨, consider the 
following example: a particular action, 𝑎, has two dimensions, one specifies quantity of 
resources put into combat operations (such as kinetic strikes), the other specifies the 
resources put into noncombat operations (such as economic development projects). In 
other words, military strategy involves choosing an action that involves multiple 
dimensions in an extremely complex operational environment. The range of action 
available to a commander across all such dimensions is huge, which underscores the need 
for the principal to effectively induce the desired behavior (on this issue of such latitude 
in military command, see Van Creveld 1985).       
The principal’s objective function v is such that there exists actions and states (𝑎,𝜔) such that 𝑣(𝑎,𝜔) = 𝑉 and for all other 𝑎!,𝜔! , 𝑣(𝑎′,𝜔′) < 𝑉. The principal has 
a goal, which is 𝑣(𝑎,𝜔) ≥ 𝑉 with probability one. If the goal is reached with probability 
one, then the conflict ends and there is no future cost. If the goal is not reached with 
probability one, then there is a positive expected future cost of conflict. We will address 
this cost more explicitly in Section 3.2.      
The principal cannot observe the realization of ω, the agent’s actions 𝑎, or the 
realized value of the function 𝑣(𝑎,𝜔). The principal uses a metric 𝑝, chosen from the set 
of feasible metrics 𝓜, to gain information about 𝑣 and the goal. A metric 𝑝 is a function 
from the space of actions and states of world to the real numbers.12    
Before proceeding with the model, we provide a simple example to give a 
concrete illustration of the separation of information and incentives.   
 
Example 1 (Information versus Incentive) Suppose that there are two possible states of 
the world: the enemy is ‘weak’ (denoted below as 𝜔 = 0), and the enemy is ‘strong’ 
(denoted below as 𝜔 =   1). The agent observes this and bases its choice on the 
opposition’s strength. The actions available to the agent are ‘direct attack’ (denoted 
below as 𝑎 = 0) and ‘indirect attack’ (denoted below as 𝑎 = 1). The appropriate action 
is a direct attack if the opponent is weak (𝑎⁰(0) = 0), and an indirect attack if the 
opponent is strong (𝑎⁰(1) = 1). The principal has different values for different states and 
actions of the agent. These values are described below. Recall that the principal cannot 
observe the state, actions, or value. The goal of the principal is to get the value at or 
above 10 for sure; only at this point will the operations be concluded. Formally, the 
values 𝑣(𝑎,𝜔) with action 𝑎 ∈ {0,1} and states 𝜔 ∈ {0,1} are    
 𝑣 0,0 = 20, 𝑣 0,1 = 2, 𝑣(1,0) = 0, 𝑣(1,1) = 5.   
 First, we provide an example of a metric that has perfect incentives and provides 
no information to the principal. Metric 1 below is such a metric.    
 𝑝¹(0,0) = 1,𝑝¹(0,1) = 0,𝑝¹(1,0) = 0,𝑝¹(1,1) = 1      
 
With metric 1, the agent maximizes the metric by picking the appropriate action 
for each state of the world. If the principal understands the incentive of the metric, then it 
will know that in state 0 the agent takes action 0, and in state 1 the agent takes action 1. 
In other words, the agent will choose a direct attack when the enemy is weak and an 
indirect attack when the enemy is strong; these are the appropriate responses within 
these two states of the world. The problem for the principal is that the two situations 
result in a metric value of 1. Thus, there is no way for the principal to know which state 
of the world has been realized; the principal does not know if the conflict is going 
exceptionally well (value 20) or not so well (value 5). Although the metric gives 
information in the weak sense that the principal knows one of these two cases must have 
occurred, the lack of information about the states of the world (and more importantly v) 
keeps the conflict continuing indefinitely, even in the case that the goal has actually been 
attained. Second, we provide an example of a metric that is fully informative about the 
state of the world, but gives the agent the wrong incentives in both states.  
   𝑝²(0,0) = 0,𝑝²(0,1) = 2,𝑝²(1,0) = 1,𝑝²(1,1) = 1    
 
Based on metric 2, the agent will pick action 1 in state 0 and action 0 in state 1. These 
are the actions the principal would least like the agent to take. If the principal 
understands the incentives of the agent, however, then it will know that the agent will 
choose these actions. Since these outcomes have distinct metrics (action  0 in state 1 
yields: 2, and action 1 in state 0 yields: 1), the principal can observe the metric and 
determine whether the state is 0 or 1. Thus, the metric is perfectly informative - the 
principal knows for sure the state and action in each state of the world. Although metric 
2 provides perfect information, it will never incentivize the agent to perform the correct 
action in state 0 and consequently the conflict will continue indefinitely. Third, we 
present a metric that has information and incentives properties less extreme than the first 
two examples.  
  𝑝³(0,0) = 2,𝑝³(0,1) = 1,𝑝³(1,0) = 0,𝑝³(1,1) = 1   
   
In state 1, the agent might take either action and the principal is able to infer the 
state, but not the action. While in state 0, the metric gives the correct incentives and is 
informative to the principal. Thus, if state 0 occurs, then the agent will take action 0 and 
the principal will know that the value function is 20 and the operation has been 
successful.   
 
The Agent’s Problem       
There are two types of agents: 0 and 1, with the arbitrary type denoted by the 
parameter 𝜃, where 𝜃 ∈ 0,1 . The agent knows its type and the objective function of the 
agent is dependent on the type. The principal uses linear incentive contracts based on the 
performance measure.13 The incentive contract for the agent for actions 𝑎 in state ω is 𝑏𝑝 𝑎,𝜔 , where 𝑏 is the performance bonus.14 As we will see later, only one type of 
agent is motivated by the incentive contract. We assume that the agent observes the state 
of the world ω before the decision of actions 𝑎 ∈ 𝑨, where 𝑨 is a compact subset of ℝ!!   for 𝑛 ≥ 2.15         
The agent is given an endowment of resources 𝑟 determined exogenously. We 
formalize the ability of military institutions to induce full effort utilization by assuming 
full resource utilization. That is, 𝑎₁+. . .+𝑎! = 𝑟.      
The agent type depends on the environment of the conflict. We will illustrate this 
in full when we cover the cases of World War II and the Vietnam War. The first type is 
an agent who maximizes the principal’s objective function regardless of the metric. For 
this to be true an agent must be able to observe and understand 𝑣 and have external 
incentives that make maximizing 𝑣 the priority. On the other hand, if an agent cannot 
observe (or understand) 𝑣 or is not externally incentivized to maximize 𝑣, then it can only 
maximize the performance bonus.      
The distinct nature of military institutions greatly impacts the principal-agent 
interaction. We derive a simple, yet useful result regarding the optimal bonus 𝑏: the 
optimal bonus is arbitrarily small. Take any fixed endowment 𝑟  and consider the optimal 
choice of the bonus 𝑏. Since the agent always utilizes full effort, for all 𝑏 > 0, the agent 
will find it optimal to choose the same effort distribution. Since bonus payment is costly 
for the principal, the smallest positive bonus will give the principal the highest expected 
utility. Technically, this causes a problem of non-existence of a solution, since for all 𝑏 > 0 there exists 𝑏′ such that 𝑏 > 𝑏′ > 0. To rectify this closure issue, we take the 
bonus to be effectively costless to the principal.      
At this point we drop the arbitrarily small bonus from the notation. We do this 
because we are assuming that: (i) the bonus is small enough that the agent of type 0 does 
not respond to it at all, and (ii) the bonus is still sufficient to direct the behavior of agent 
type 1 to just maximize the metric and get the largest bonus possible. We formalize these 
two types below.      
The objective function of type 𝜃 = 0 is the value function 𝑣(𝑎,𝜔). The agent has 
fixed resources 𝑟 and picks its actions to maximize 𝑣. Denote the optimal actions of type 0 by    𝑎⁰(𝜔) ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥!∈𝑨{𝑣(𝑎,𝜔)| 𝑎!!!!! = 𝑟}.         
 
The objective function of type 𝜃 = 1 is the metric 𝑝(𝑎,𝜔).16 The agent has fixed 
resources 𝑟 and picks its actions to maximize 𝑝. Denote the optimal actions of type 1 by  
 
  𝑎¹(𝑝,𝜔) ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥!∈𝑨{𝑝(𝑎,𝜔)| 𝑎!!!!! = 𝑟}.         
 
We assume that all 𝑝 ∈ℳ and 𝑣 are continuous and the constraint set is compact, 
which guarantees the existence of a solution to both problems.17   
 
The Principal’s Problem       
The principal does not necessarily know the realized type of the agent. It believes 
that the agent is of type 0 with probability 𝜇 ∈ [0,1] and of type 1 with probability 1−𝜇.18    
Given some metric 𝑝 and realization of the metric 𝜌, we construct the principal's 
expected utility. First we must define some preliminaries.      
A metric increase the ex ante expected payoff of the principal in two ways. First, 
if a metric is said to have better incentives, then that means the metric induces the agent 
of type 0 to take actions that result in a higher ex ante expected value for the principal. 
This increases the principal’s expected payoff now as well as in the future. Second, if a 
metric is said to provide better information, then that means the ex ante expected future 
payoff of the principal is increased because (i) knowing more about the state of the world 
helps the principal use resources better in the future, reducing the cost of conflict and (ii) 
the increased knowledge of the conflict allows the principal to realize with greater clarity 
when its goal has been met.      
For simplicity we reduce the set of possible metrics to functions characterized by 
two parameters (𝑥,𝑦). We assume that the real numbers (𝑥,𝑦) capture all the relevant 
features about the metric. Thus a metric 𝑝 is identified completely by its parameters (𝑥,𝑦); where 𝑥  indicates the informational content of the metric and 𝑦 indicates the 
incentive value of the metric. The possible values of (𝑥,𝑦) lie in the intervals [0,𝑋] and [0,𝑌], where 𝑥 = 𝑋 indicates a perfectly informative metric and 𝑦 = 𝑌 indicates a metric 
with ideal incentives.19       
We make the following simplifying assumptions about the structure of the 
possible metric in order to provide parsimony to the analysis. Since all incentive features 
of the metric are captured by 𝑦, the agent's actions in type 𝜃 = 1 are only impacted by the 
change in the parameter 𝑦. Formally, we can rewrite the function 𝑎¹(𝑦,𝜔) instead of 𝑎¹(𝑝,𝜔). Similarly, we impose that all information value comes through an increase in 
the parameter 𝑥.      
Denote by 𝑣⁰(𝜔) = 𝑣(𝑎⁰(𝜔),𝜔) and 𝑣¹(𝑦,𝜔) = 𝑣(𝑎¹(𝑦,𝜔),𝜔). The principal’s 
immediate expected utility of the metric is:    𝑉⁰   =   ∫!𝑣⁰(𝜔)𝑑𝑓,  𝑉! 𝑦   = ∫!𝑣!(𝑦,𝜔)𝑑𝑓.      
 
Since we have defined the parameter 𝑦 as the incentive value of the metric, 
formally this means that an increase in 𝑦 increases 𝑉¹(𝑦). For convenience we also 
assume that 𝑉¹ is twice-continuously differentiable and concave in y.      
The second part of the principal’s payoff is the future cost of the continued 
conflict. This cost is lowered by both the nature and precision of information. The cost is 
also impacted by incentives of the metric in the case that 𝜃 = 1. We denote the two cost 
functions for parameters 𝜃 ∈ {0,1},𝛷⁰(𝑥) and 𝛷¹(𝑥,𝑦). We assume that the future cost 
of the conflict is decreasing and convex in each information and incentive value of the 
metric. Formally, if 𝛷⁰(𝑥) > 0 and 𝛷¹(𝑥,𝑦) > 0, then all 𝑥 and 𝑦 are such that 𝜕𝛷⁰(𝑥)/𝜕𝑥 < 0 and 𝜕²𝛷⁰(𝑥)/𝜕𝑥² ≥ 0, while 𝜕𝛷¹(𝑥,𝑦)/𝜕𝑥 < 0 and 𝜕²𝛷¹(𝑥,𝑦)/𝜕𝑥² ≥0. Further, we assume that 𝜕𝛷¹(𝑥,𝑦)/𝜕𝑦 < 0,𝜕²𝛷¹(𝑥,𝑦)/𝜕𝑦² ≥ 0 and 𝜕²𝛷¹(𝑥,𝑦)/𝜕𝑥𝜕𝑦 = 0. These assumptions reflect the future value of information in the sense that 
more information helps the conflict end more quickly and with fewer losses. The second 
order properties of the cost function reflect that the marginal value of information is 
decreasing at higher information levels.      
In addition we impose that the information parameter increases the cost of 
continued conflict in the same way in both types of agent. That is, 𝜕𝛷⁰(𝑥)/𝜕𝑥 =𝜕𝛷¹(𝑥,𝑦)/𝜕𝑥  for all 𝑥,𝑦. This assumption is made to for the purpose of parsimony.      
The cost to implement a metric is denoted by 𝐶(𝑥 + 𝑦) and is increasing at an 
increasing rate: 𝐶′ > 0 and 𝐶′′ > 0. The cost assumption reflects the feature that the cost 
of implementing a better metric in either dimension is increasing and the marginal cost 
becomes larger as the aggregate level of information and incentives increase. The 
assumption also captures the increasing difficulty of actual implementation of a better 
metric.      
Thus, the principal’s expected payoff is    
 𝑈(𝑥,𝑦) = 𝜇[𝑉⁰− 𝛷⁰(𝑥)]+ (1− 𝜇)[𝑉¹(𝑦)− 𝛷¹(𝑥,𝑦)]− 𝐶(𝑥 + 𝑦).         
The principal's maximization problem is    
 𝑚𝑎𝑥(!,!)∈[!,!]×[!,!]𝑈(𝑥,𝑦).       
 
It is worth noting that we have constrained the principal to use a very restrictive 
class of pooling contracts as their metric. We have done so based on our beliefs that the 
institutional constraints of our application would not allow for more efficient sorting 
contracts. Further, we have assumed that no optimal pooling contract exists, i.e., 𝑣 is not 
in the set of possible metrics.      
Given some value for 𝜇 ∈ [0,1), the first order condition that defines all interior 
solutions of the optimal metric choice problem is 𝜕𝑈(𝑥!∗ ,𝑦!∗)/𝜕𝑥 = 0 and 𝜕𝑈(𝑥!∗ ,𝑦!∗)/𝜕𝑦 = 0 or  
 
 −𝜇𝛷!!(𝑥!!∗ )− (1− 𝜇) !!! !!∗ ,!!∗!" − 𝐶′(𝑥!∗ + 𝑦!∗) = 0  (1) 
 1− 𝜇 𝑉!! 𝑦!∗ − !!! !!∗ ,!!∗!"     −         𝐶! 𝑥!∗ + 𝑦!∗ = 0   (2) 
  
For any interior solution, the following intuitive relationship must hold   
 −𝜇𝛷!!(𝑥!!∗ )− (1− 𝜇) !!! !!∗ ,!!∗!"𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 1− 𝜇 𝑉!! 𝑦!∗ − !!! !!∗ ,!!∗!"𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠  
 
The information value is based on how much the realization of the metric allows 
the principal to infer about the state of the world and consequently the value function. 
More knowledge about the state of the world allows the principal to make better 
decisions in the future that lower the future cost of conflict as well as recognize the goal 
has been attained sooner. The value of better incentives is based on inducing a type 1 
agent to take actions that are better for the principal.      
In what follows, the model is used as the basis of understanding the special cases 
that correspond to the Second World War and the Vietnam War.   
 
VARIATION ACROSS WARTIME ENVIRONMENTS  
We illustrate the model’s insights by comparing heterogeneous wartime cases. 
The United States’ participation in the Second World War and the Vietnam War provide 
significant variation on the parameters of interest. In doing so, we show that each of these 
historical conflicts accord with a special case of the model. The Second World War 
accords with the case in which the agent’s incentives align with the objective function of 
the principal. Further, it was a wartime environment in which the agent could easily 
apprehend the objective function and how its efforts contributed to progress towards the 
principal’s goal. Finally, the principal knew the agent’s type - it understood the nature of 
the agent it was commanding. In Vietnam, these things were not the case: the agent did 
not understand the wartime environment and it did not apprehend how its efforts would 
contribute to achieving the principal’s underlying goals. Further, the model stipulates that 
both the agent’s incentives must align with the principal’s objective function and that the 
principal knows the agent’s type. These necessary conditions were not met; ergo, metric 
selection was problematic. We now demonstrate the model through these illustrative 
cases.   
 
The Second World War       
We argue, in the case material that follows, that World War II fits the parameter 
values 𝜃 = 0 (the agent's incentives are aligned with those of the principal), and 𝜇 = 1 
(the principal knows for sure the agent’s type). If 𝜃 = 0 and 𝜇 = 1, then the marginal 
utility through incentives is zero. This is because, regardless of metric, the agent always 
maximizes the objective function in every state of the world. In this case, the optimal 
metric selection reduces to maximizing the information value alone. The principal can 
focus solely on attaining as much information as possible to understand when the goal 
has been met and thereby reduce future cost.      
Since it is optimal to set 𝑦!∗ = 0, the first order conditions for the optimal metric 
choice reduce to    
 −𝜕𝛷! 𝑥!∗𝜕𝑥 = 𝐶′(𝑥!∗).       
This is a relatively straightforward problem; choose a metric that balances 
benefits of more information with the cost of implementation.   
 Second World War Empirical Case      
To apply the model to the case of the Second World War requires exploring the 
values of the three parameters. The first is 𝜃; this is the agent type. In this case, the 
agent’s incentives were aligned with the principal’s objective function (𝑣). Second, is in 
regards to the objective function itself, which, in this case, could easily be observed and 
understood by the agent. The third is 𝜇, the principal’s belief regarding the agent’s type; 
in this case, that the principal had knowledge that agent’s type was zero. In sum, the 
principal in the Second World War was not bedeviled by malign agent incentives, and 
could concentrate its metrics efforts on gathering information.      
A crucial aspect of the Second World War was that the agent was incentive-
aligned to the principal’s conception of victory. By the end of the war, the size of the 
United States Army had risen to 8,266,373, from a pre-war size of just 269,023 (for more 
detailed discussion on this process of expansion see Koistenen 2004, and Newland and 
Chun 2011). The vast majority of these soldiers were draftees, who had been conscripted 
for the duration of the conflict (Chambers 1999: 181). This conscription mechanism 
aligned the principal’s goal for victory with the agents’ goal of resuming civilian life. To 
reiterate Kerr’s encapsulation of this incentive for the soldiers: “What did the GI in 
World War II want? To go home. And when did he get to go home? When the war was 
won!” (Kerr 1975: 771).      
A second component of the agent’s type is that the agent understands the nature of 
the principal’s value function and how its effort contributes to progress towards that goal. 
The early twentieth century represented the marriage of Napoleonic military strategy, 
nationalism, and the industrial revolution. Success in such warfare was predicated on 
destroying enemy forces, crippling the enemy society, and occupying its territory; 
President Roosevelt justified this wartime strategy to the US Congress: “We wage total 
war because our very existence is threatened...[it] is a grim reality...In total war we are all 
soldiers” (quoted in Heuser 2010: 194). Given this operational environment, the war was 
a relatively simple (though by no means easy) affair. The US Army built a doctrine in the 
inter-war period that embodied this understanding and provided a blueprint for agent 
activity:  
World War I gave no promise that victory in modern war could grow from 
anything but the application of superior resources, not in dazzling maneuver... but 
in hard fighting. In the army’s professional school system [throughout the inter-
war period]... the war was fought and refought again and again... and the 
emphasis always was on the intractability of modern strategic problems to any 
solution save that of overwhelming power (Weigley 1986: 269).       
 
Given this clarity, the principal had a high degree of certainty of the agent type - 
and was able to resource and reward the agent effectively. The exemplars of this type of 
war were General George Patton and General Curtis LeMay. Patton let his subordinates 
know clearly what was expected of them in a famous speech to his Third Army troops in 
May of 1944: “There is only one tactical principle which is not subject to change. It is to 
use the means at hand to inflict the maximum amount of wound, death, and destruction 
on the enemy in the minimum amount of time.” This was normal fare for Patton, who 
wrote in his diary that year: “Made a talk [today]. As in all my talks I stressed fighting 
and killing” (quoted in Overy 1995: 173). Patton was as good as his word, becoming one 
of the most feared battlefield commanders of the war: “The statistical imbalance... was 
staggering... In total casualties - dead, wounded, and captured - the Third Army [under 
Patton] caused the enemy ten times the losses that it suffered - by far the greatest ratio of 
damage inflicted versus losses incurred in the entire Anglo-American force” (Hanson 
1990: 303). Similarly, LeMay was considered a successful operational leader in the war; 
he was directly responsible for fire bombing 63 Japanese cities, killing a half-million 
Japanese civilians, and de-housing another 8 million. In short, “[f]or Lemay, demolishing 
everything was how you win a war” (Kaplan 1983: 43). Similar to Patton, LeMay was 
judged a successful commander for utilizing assets for maximum destruction (he was 
later Air Force Chief of Staff and was the youngest four-star general in modern history). 
These agent activities, then, could be linked directly back to the war’s operational 
benchmarks that had been established months before the Pearl Harbor attack: control of 
the seas, operational air superiority, disruption of enemy industry, and ultimately the 
destruction of enemy military forces (see Kirkpatrick 1992: 63-77).      
In sum, the United States war effort from 1941-1945 exemplified one case of the 
model. The agent’s incentives aligned with those of the principal, the agent could grasp 
the nature of the true value function, and the principal was aware of the agent type. Taken 
together, these parameter values allowed the principal to focus his measurement efforts 
towards the gathering of information.20 Such an attractive wartime environment has not 
always been the case in US military efforts. We now proceed to a conflict that had very 
different characteristics.   
 
The Vietnam War       
We argue in what follows that the Vietnam War fits a second case of our model: 
that 𝜃 = 1 and 𝜇 > 0. That is, the agent is of type 1 and the principal is not sure of the 
agent’s type. In this case, the principal is in a position where it must consider the trade-
off between information and incentives. If the principal does not know that the agent’s 
parameter is 1, then this leads to the principal choosing a metric that overvalues 
information, compared to the case when the principal knows that 𝜃 = 1. We show this 
formally in the following proposition. In what follows we assume that there is an interior 
solution for all 𝜇 ∈ (0,1].   
 
Proposition 1 If the principal’s beliefs are 𝜇 > 0 instead of 𝜇 = 0 when 𝜃 = 1, then 𝑥!∗ >   𝑥!∗ and 𝑦!∗ < 𝑦!∗.   
 
Proof of Proposition 1. The argument for why the principal over-invests in information 
and under-invests in incentives is based on using the first order conditions (1) and (2). 
Take the optimal metric at 𝜇 = 0, (𝑥!∗,𝑦!∗). Now let us consider 𝜇 > 0 and the choice of 
an optimal metric. We will show that the optimal metric for 𝜇 > 0 is such that 𝑥!∗ >   𝑥!∗ 
and 𝑦!∗ <   𝑦!∗.  Let us begin with considering metric (𝑥!∗,𝑦!∗) for some 𝜇 > 0.  We will 
construct a sequences of parameters and define the first element of this sequence by 𝑥¹ = 𝑥!∗ and 𝑦¹ = 𝑦!∗. The marginal value from incentives is decreasing in µ. Therefore, 
at 𝑥!∗ it must be that the incentive parameter is some 𝑦² < 𝑦!∗  to satisfy (2) with 𝜇 > 0. 
Based on the strict concavity of the objective function in 𝑦, such a 𝑦² is unique. At 𝑦², the 
marginal cost is lower at 𝑥!∗  and consequently the marginal value of information must be 
decreased to satisfy (1). Since the marginal value of information is non-increasing in 𝑥, 𝑥 
must be increased to 𝑥² >   𝑥!∗  to equalize (1). Based on the strict concavity of the 
objective function in 𝑥, such a 𝑥² is unique. We continue with an iteration of the same 
process; 𝑦³ < 𝑦² must be picked to satisfy (2) at 𝑥². At 𝑦³, the marginal cost is lower and 
the value of 𝑥 must be increased to 𝑥³ to equalize (1). These directions of change 
continue with each iterative step, and we use them to construct two sequences 𝑥!   and 𝑦! . Each sequence is strictly monotonic and with each element of the sequence 
contained in a compact space ([0,𝑋] and [0,𝑌], respectively). Any strictly monotonic 
sequence in a compact space must converge to some point in that space. Further, the 
sequences must converge to the unique equilibrium (𝑥!∗ ,𝑦!∗). based on the continuity of 
the first order conditions. Since 𝑥!   is a strictly increasing sequence and 𝑦!   is a strictly 
decreasing sequence, it must be that 𝑥!∗ = lim!→! 𝑥! > 𝑥¹ =   𝑥!∗ and 𝑦!∗ = lim!→! 𝑦! <𝑦¹ =   𝑦!∗. n 
 
Further, not knowing that the agent is type 1 creates an informational bias that 
skews the principal towards believing the conflict is going better than is actually the case. 
In Proposition 2, we prove that if the principal does not know for sure the agent is type 𝜃 = 1, than the principal’s beliefs about the conflict will be skewed towards over 
optimism. We make this argument with the metric choice fixed. If we also consider that 
the metric is skewed towards information (from Proposition 1), then the over optimism 
problem is further exacerbated.      
The proposition is based on the following reasoning. The principal receives 
information from the realized value of the metric, but cannot observe the underlying state 
of the world and actions. The principal thinks there is some probability that the agent is 
type 0 and in that case, for such a realization of the metric, the actual level of success 
would be higher. Since the agent is actually type 1, the principal's expected value of 
actual success is higher than reality. This is what drives the optimistic bias.      
In order to show this result we add more structure to our set of possible metrics. 
The following properties are used to prove the proposition. First, a metric 𝑝 is varied on 
the state space Ω if, for all 𝜔 ∈ Ω there exists 𝜔′ ∈ Ω such that 𝑝(𝑎⁰(𝜔),𝜔) = 𝑝(𝑎¹(𝜔′),𝜔′). This means the set of states of the world is varied enough 
that there is a state such that a metric can come up with any value given an agent of type 
0 or 1. Second, a metric 𝑝 is state consistent with 𝑣 if for all states 𝜔,𝜔′ ∈ Ω and actions 
a, 𝑝(𝑎,𝜔′) > 𝑝(𝑎,𝜔) if and only if 𝑣(𝑎,𝜔′) > 𝑣(𝑎,𝜔). This means that, fixing the 
actions of the agent, any state that improves the metric similarly improves the principal’s 
objective.   
 
Proposition 2 Suppose that the metric is varied and state consistent with 𝑣 and does not 
have perfect incentives (i.e., 𝑦 < 𝑌). If 𝜃 = 1 and the principal believes that there is 
some probability that 𝜃 = 0, then the principal expectation of v will be higher than if it 
knew 𝜃 = 1 for sure.   
 
Proof of Proposition 2. Denote 𝜌 as the realized value of the metric. Based on the fact 
that 𝑝 is varied on Ω there exists the non-empty sets of states Ω⁰(𝜌) and Ω¹(𝜌) such that 𝑝(𝑎⁰(𝜔),𝜔) = 𝑝(𝑎¹(𝑦,𝜑),𝜑) = 𝜌 for all 𝜔 ∈Ω⁰(𝜌) and 𝜑 ∈ Ω¹(𝜌). Based on the fact 
that 𝑎! 𝜔   is defined as a maximizer of 𝑣 at each 𝜔, 𝑣(𝑎⁰(𝜔),𝜔) > 𝑣(𝑎⁰(𝜑),𝜑) for all 𝜔 ∈ Ω⁰(𝜌) and 𝜑 ∈ Ω¹(𝜌). Further, we know by the optimality of 𝑎⁰ that 𝑣⁰(𝜑) >𝑣¹(𝑦,𝜑) for 𝑦 < 𝑌. Putting these together we have that 
   ∫!⁰(!)𝑣(𝑎⁰(𝜔),𝜔)𝑑𝑓 > ∫!¹(!)𝑣⁰(𝜔)𝑑𝑓 > ∫!¹(!)𝑣¹(𝑦,𝜔)𝑑𝑓  (3) 
 
Note that  
 𝐸[𝑉⁰|𝜌,𝜃 = 0] = ∫!⁰(!)𝑣(𝑎⁰(𝜔),𝜔)𝑑𝑓, 
 𝐸[𝑉¹(𝑦)|𝜌,𝜃 = 1] = ∫!¹(!)𝑣¹(𝑦,𝜔)𝑑𝑓, 
 
and (3) implies that 𝐸 𝑉! 𝜌,𝜃 = 0 > 𝐸 𝑉! 𝑦 𝜌,𝜃 = 1 . Based on the fact that we have 
assumed that the observation of 𝜌 does not impact 𝜇, we can use these to compare the 
expected values when 𝜇 = 0 and 𝜇 > 0 and complete our proof. Note that  
 
𝐸 𝑉!(𝑦) 𝜌, 𝜇 = 0 =   𝐸 𝑉! 𝑦 𝜌,𝜃 = 1                                                                                                                                                                               <   𝜇𝐸 𝑉! 𝜌,𝜃 = 0 + 1− 𝜇 𝐸 𝑉! 𝑦 𝜌,𝜃 = 1=   𝐸[𝑉!(𝑦)|𝜌, 𝜇 > 0].        
 n      
Now we apply these results to understating the conflict in Vietnam.   
 
Vietnam War Empirical Case      
The case of Second World War can be contrasted with that of the Vietnam War. 
In this vastly different operational environment, US military leaders attempted to defeat a 
political insurgency and establish a viable South Vietnamese government through the 
operational benchmark of ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of the population. The core 
tactical metric, however, was the use of ‘body counts’ to attrit enemy forces to the degree 
that they could no longer replace their losses. The pathology engendered by this metric 
choice, however, was that it incentivized large-scale killing and destruction, which 
worked against the goal of building a viable political regime in the South. It is important 
to emphasize that killing is understood to be a defining aspect of any war; in the case of 
Vietnam, however, as the principal was unaware of the agent's type, the pursuit of the 
metric for its own sake reduced the informational content provided by the reported body 
counts. In other words, while counting enemy dead provided important information in the 
Second World War context, it failed to do so in Vietnam. Further, our model helps to 
explain why the military in Vietnam over-produced violence, and why the political 
leadership was unduly optimistic given the assessments from field.      
Once again, it is important to stipulate that the Vietnam military challenge 
contained multiple dimensions that needed to be addressed: military, political, economic, 
and social. Any optimal action choice, 𝑎, would need to be balanced appropriately across 
these dimensions. Carland summarizes the problem thusly: “when military victories were 
won, their significance lay in the degree to which they advanced and supported South 
Vietnam’s pacification/nation-building effort... if they failed to integrate the ‘fighting’ 
war with the ‘other’ war they would not succeed” (2004: 554). In other words, regime 
stabilization was based on several non-military dimensions that spread far beyond combat 
efforts and in which killing should have only played a supporting role (Rosenau 2005; 
Jones 2012). The ultimate goal was to establish a viable, self-sustaining polity that would 
provide a bulwark against further communist ‘dominoes’ falling across South East 
Asia.21  
The US military agent in the Vietnam War, however, did not have incentives that 
aligned with the principal’s goal of stabilization. Instead, the agent was driven toward 
pursuing the performance metric of killing. This was true for at least two reasons. First, 
soldiers served one-year tours of duty in combat (the ‘rotation system’). The incentive for 
these soldiers was to simply survive this period and go home, regardless of whether 
progress was made towards victory: “the rotation system reinforced an individualistic 
perspective that was essentially self-concerned. The end of the war was marked by the 
individual's rotation date and not by the war's eventual outcome--whether victory, defeat, 
or negotiated stalemate” (Moskos 1975: 31). The second set of incentives was for career 
officers and noncommissioned officers. In fact, Moskos argues that this rotation system 
drove this novel bifurcation within the Army organization: “where army internal 
cleavages had formerly derived from the basic distinction between enlisted men and 
commissioned officers, the emergent distinction became that between single-term 
soldiers - whether officer or enlisted - and career soldiers - whether officer and enlisted” 
(1975: 32). For these career-oriented ‘lifers’ the incentive in Vietnam was to maximize 
performance metrics for the purpose of earning citations and promotions during their 
rotation. In sum, officers and units were driven to maximize the performance metric 
while the drafted personnel were incentivized to simply survive. As we will show below, 
these twin dynamics created an agent that was driven to overproduce violence and 
casualties, rather build a sustainable South Vietnamese regime.      
Even if agent incentives had aligned with the objective function of the principal, it 
would not have been able to pursue that goal very effectively. It was simply the case that 
the US military could not determine how to best use its resources in Vietnam.  
 
US policy makers had outlined national objectives, such as South Vietnamese 
independence and territorial integrity, countering Communist influence and 
pressure, and controlling insurgent elements. Clear objectives for the use of 
military force, though, never accompanied these general goals, leaving the armed 
forces searching for linkages between strategy and policy (Daddis 2011: 47).  
 
In the absence of establishing this linkage between force and policy the army defaulted 
back to its traditional way of war: “When General Westmoreland was asked at a press 
conference what the answer to insurgency was, his reply was one word: ‘Firepower’” 
(Krepinevich 1986: 197).     
 The Army's default to conventional warfighting techniques matched with a 
performance measure based on killing: the infamous ‘body count.’ Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara was the originator of this metric:   
 
I insisted we try to measure progress... I was convinced that, while we might not 
be able to track something as unambiguous as a frontline, we could find variables 
that would indicate our success or failure... Critics point to use of the body count 
as an example of my obsession with numbers... Obviously, there are things you 
cannot quantify... [b]ut things you can count, you ought to count. Loss of life is 
one when you are fighting a war of attrition. We tried to use body counts as a 
measurement to help us figure out what we should be doing in Vietnam to win the 
war while putting our troops at the least risk (McNamara 1995: 237-238).     
   
Given this imposed metric of performance, the agent pursued it accordingly. Appy writes 
that these “death tallies were constantly monitored and updated. In rear areas, command 
posts listed ‘box scores’ on large chalkboards... Indeed, killing was the central focus of 
American policy” (1993: 144). In turn, as Shelby Stanton writes, units and officers were 
“rewarded by promotions, medals, and time off from field duty. For example, General 
Westmoreland had issued a special commendation to the 11th Infantry Brigade based on 
its claim of 128 killed at My Lai [these victims turned out to be civilians, in what was 
later deemed the ‘My Lai Massacre’]” (quoted in Gartner 1997: 128-129). Such gross 
levels of violence was inimical to the ultimate goal of ‘winning hearts and minds’ of the 
South Vietnamese people, yet US forces in Vietnam were incentivized to engage in such 
indiscriminate killing: “[T]he Army maintained that it closely observed very restrictive 
rules of engagement (ROE) throughout the war... Yet, by placing the body count above 
population security in its list of priorities, the Army provided the incentive for its 
commanders to shoot first and worry about the hearts and minds later” (Krepinevich 
1986: 198-199, emphasis added). In other words, the support of the civilian population 
was sought, but performance metrics incentivized agent behavior that was very divergent 
from the path towards the principal’s goal.      
It is unclear whether the principal knew of the nature of its agent in Vietnam. For 
one thing, the principal had very poor understanding of what the agent was doing in 
South East Asia: “lack of expertise hampered the ability of the administration to hold the 
Army's feet to the fire over counterinsurgency; thus, the Army could give lip service to 
requirements placed on it by the administration or ignore them entirely” (Krepinevich 
1986: 33). This resulted in fundamental lack of understanding for the principal as to how 
the agent's effort was tracking with actual progress towards its goals. Secretary of 
Defense McNamara admitted that it  
 
was not the valor of American soldiers in Vietnam that was ever in dispute but 
how they should operate in the field. This issue became the focus of considerable 
disagreement between Westy [Army general Westmoreland] and the marines... 
Although deeply divided, the military never fully debated their differences in 
strategic approach, or discussed them with me in any detail. As secretary of 
defense, I should have forced them to (McNamara 1995: 243, emphasis added).     
  
As the model predicts, the principal's uncertainty over agent type resulted in 
systematic over-optimism concerning the war's progress. This was highlighted most 
clearly by the infamous ‘light at the end of the tunnel’ pronouncement, made by 
Westmoreland in November of 1967. In media interviews and at the National Press Club 
during a trip to Washington, Westmoreland exuded confidence and, in turn, briefly 
buoyed public perception regarding the war: “With a definite end of the war in sight, the 
American public caught some of the optimism... even the popularity of President 
Johnson, which had been on a long downward spiral, recovered 10 ten points in one 
month... after General Westmoreland’s optimistic trip” (Blood 2005: 41). This optimism 
was not just reserved for the public: “A ‘we are winning’ consensus pretty much 
permeated the Saigon-Washington command circuit...” (Ford 1998). This sense of 
confidence in the war’s progress was based on the body counts. This stemmed from the 
argument that as soon as enemy deaths outpaced the ability of the enemy to recruit new 
soldiers, the war was essentially won (it had reached the ‘crossover point’), and official 
statistics showed that the crossover point had indeed been reached in December of 1966 
(Blood 2005: 29).22 This fits with our model: the principal did not know that the agent 
was pursuing the metric (body counts) rather than the objective function (a stable South 
Vietnamese regime), and as a result was overly optimistic regarding the war’s progress as 
enemy deaths mounted.23       
In sum, the Vietnam War exemplifies the problematic case of the model. The 
agent’s incentives differ from those of the principal and the principal does not know the 
agent’s type. In this case the agent pursues its performance measure, regardless of 
whether this activity contributes to the principal’s goal. In fact, in the case of Vietnam, 
the agent’s performance measure (body counts) worked against the principal’s goal of 
stabilizing South Vietnam. Two decades after the war, Secretary McNamara recognized 
this pathology: “Westy’s attrition strategy relied heavily on firepower... It often proved 
difficult to distinguish combatants from noncombatants. Fighting produced more and 
more civilian casualties... [and this]... undermined, in an unintended but profound way, 
the pacification program designed to... win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the South 
Vietnamese people” (McNamara 1995: 243).    
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
We have explored the dangers of neglecting to select metrics in wartime carefully. 
In particular, we developed a model to understand how imperfect measures of success 
may have deleterious externalities by creating unintended incentive structures for agents 
within the organization. Through a principal-agent analysis specifically tailored for 
application to military organizations in wartime, we have shown that the informational 
properties of the measurements are based on how the measure differs from operational 
success while the incentive properties of the measurement are based on differences in the 
marginal sensitivity of both the measure and operational success. We have shown that if 
the agent’s incentives align with the principal's goal, the principal knows the agent’s type, 
and the agent understands how his actions affect the value function, then effective 
measurement is possible. Further, we then provided a framework to show the trade-off 
between information and incentives. Finally, we have shown that an under-appreciation 
of the incentive properties of measurement will lead to systematic positive bias of 
information.      
We explored how two theoretical cases of the model accord with two historical 
cases from US foreign policy. In the case of the Second World War, the incentives of the 
agent aligned with that of the principal. Further, the agent observed the value function 
and grasped how his efforts contributed to its pursuit. Neither of these held true in the 
case of the Vietnam War. In the absence of aligned incentives or the comprehension of 
how to progress toward the principal’s underlying goal, the agent reverted to maximizing 
the performance metric. In Vietnam, the overriding performance metric was the ‘body 
count’; this led to a pathological over-production of violence, which actually worked 
against the principal’s goal of a pacified and stable South Vietnamese regime.      
Our analysis suggests that assessment efforts in the current conflict in 
Afghanistan exhibit many similarities to those of the Vietnam War. More specifically, 
that the military agent may be unable to grasp or observe progress towards the principal’s 
goal of establishing a pacified and stable regime. Further, in the case of Afghanistan, the 
principal seems as unsure of the incentives of the agent. Servicemen and women - many 
of whom have served multiple tours in both Iraq and Afghanistan - are exhausted and 
have little reason to be optimistic about the long-term effects of their efforts in 
Afghanistan. It is reasonable to question whether they have reverted to their professional 
interests, and whether the principal would be aware of this development (see Bleigh et al. 
2011).      
Our model suggests that if the principal is uncertain as to the agent’s type, he will 
most likely be led to incorrect conclusions regarding the war effort. He may seek detailed 
information about the war, but due to the disconnect between agent activity and the 
conflict’s true progress, he will not understand the war. Consider the case of the Vietnam 
War: “Left with insufficient foundational knowledge of counterinsurgencies and vague 
strategic objectives, MACV [US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam] embraced 
Secretary of Defense McNamara's advice that everything that was measurable should in 
fact be measured... Consequently MACV - and much of the DoD - went about measuring 
everything and, in a real sense, measured nothing” (Daddis 2011: 10). This sounds 
comparable to the current conflict in Afghanistan; as Kapstein argues, allied forces in 
Afghanistan are similarly attempting to build a “comprehensive data-set... Unfortunately, 
these metrics provide little more than a hodgepodge of trends, data, and ‘atmospherics,’ 
and [yet] its unclear how they relate to the war effort. In fact, this grab-bag of evidence 
suggests only one thing: that coalition forces still don't know how to measure their 
progress” (Kapstein 2011, emphasis in original). Our work further predicts that this 
continued effort will likely result in an upwardly biased assessment of the progress of the 
conflict - the principal may myopically believe that he is seeing a ‘light at the end of the 
tunnel’ or that the war has ‘turned a corner’ - when it, in fact, has not. Further research 
would be necessary to assess the degree to which the pathologies we have highlighted 
here do indeed exist in the Afghanistan conflict (for a critical overview of such efforts, 
see Connable 2012).      
Finally, it is important to re-emphasize that our model is not restricted to these 
particular conflicts, but to wartime assessment in general. We recommend that the 
political leadership reorient its efforts to assess the military progress in all conflicts, 
taking into account incentives rather than relying on ever-greater levels of information. 
More specifically, we recommend searching for measures that are sensitive to action-
choices of the military agent in as similar a way as possible to the ultimate political goal 
across as many states of the world as possible. The goal is to incentivize the agent to 
pursue the best interest of the principal, through pursuit of the performance metric, rather 
than to produce divergent - and perhaps counterproductive - behavior.   
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1. There is a significant literature on principal-agent relations with imperfect performance 
measure. Gibbons (1998) provides an excellent overview of some of this literature. Our 
model is most similar to the model of Baker (1992), which is used to examine the optimal 
balance of bonus and fixed salary compensation. In Section 2 we discuss the military-
specific assumptions that separate our work from the literature pertaining to civilian labor 
contracts.  
2. In the strategic studies literature, this is referred to as relating the goals of ‘military 
strategy’ (effective use of force) to the higher goals of ‘grand strategy’ (the country's 
overall foreign policy). On these points see Millett, Murray, and Watman (1986).  
3. We find that treating the military as a single agent is a useful abstraction to provide 
focus and clarity.  Of course, the ‘military agent’ is actually an immense organization 
teeming with internal agency problems. The nature of these internal organizational 
problems is outside the scope this treatment.  
4. Feaver retains the term ‘shirk’ in his analysis, but redefines it to accord very closely 
with our approach - in which the principal is concerned with the nature of the agent's 
work rather than being ‘lazy’ as in the common usage of the term (2005: 58-68).  
5. For a deeper analysis of this point, see the central argument of North, Wallis, and 
Weingast (2009). Their definition of the ‘open access order’ society hinges on such 
professionalized agents that monopolize organized violence.  
6. As we will show in the case of the Vietnam War, soldiers served one-year tours of duty 
in combat (the ‘rotation system’). The incentive for these soldiers was to simply survive 
this period and go home, regardless of whether progress was made towards victory (Kerr 
1975). This behavior could be construed as ‘shirking,’ but for the purpose of survival, not 
personal enrichment. We assume away this phenomenon in the present study by unifying 
agent activity to the actual choice of tactics and operations employed by the unified 
military structure.  7.	  Permitting low effort ‘shirking’ would inherently make the incentive component of the 
metric more important. Our treatment shows the importance of incentives in spite of there 
being no concerns with inducing high effort.  
8. The analysis could be done without assuming that military institutions remove the 
possibility of shirking. In contrast to our results, such a model would be predicated on 
significant compensation to the agent based on performance, something we do not see in 
modern, professionalized military organizations. Otherwise, a more standard hidden 
action model would imply similar results.  
9. In more standard principal agent models the principal is the residual claimant - keeping 
the proceeds not given to the agent. Our model does not fit into this paradigm as our 
principal is assumed to have a fixed budget and have the sole goal of military success.    
10. Mitnick (1975) provides the first formal treatment of the agency problem; the 
principal uses resources to direct behavior of a self-interested agent in the presence of 
information asymmetry.   
11. Another relevant literature examines the problem of agency where the agent both 
gathers information and takes action based on the information. In the current manuscript 
we do not deal with issues of information acquisition by the agent, but instead focus on 
information gathering by the principal for later strategic decisions. It is very easy to see 
how the two issues could become convoluted. We treat information as verifiable in order 
to avoid the problem of delegated expertise and keep our treatment parsimonious. The 
literature dealing with information gathering in agency includes: Demski and Sappington 
(1987), Barron and Waddell (2003), Feess and Walzl (2004), Gromb and Martimort 
(2007), Malcomson (2009), and Inderst and Ottaviani (2009).  
12. It is common for military to make a distinction between ‘measurements of 
performance’ (MOPs) and ‘measurements of effects’ (MOEs) (Center for Army Lessons 
Learned 2010). The model we develop is general enough to accommodate both MOPs 
and MOEs: An MOP would only be a measure of how the agent acted (i.e., p(a)=p(a,ω) 
for all ω) while the an MOE would be a measure that only attempts to approximate v. It is 
useful to see that the notion of MOP and MOE are not separable: by definition, agent 
actions impact operational success.   
13. In our model assuming that the principal uses a linear performance bonus is without 
loss of generality, since such a bonus will be optimal.  
14. We abstract away form modeling dynamic incentives of the agent, but the bonus b is 
intended to capture the future benefit to the agent through potential promotion and 
advancement within the military organization, which is likely to provide the agent more 
expected utility in the future. We do not model this explicitly to avoid introducing 
unnecessary complexity to our model.  
15. It is not important that the agent knows everything about the state of the world, just 
that the agent is in some way more informed about the state than the principal.  
16. The agent maximizes the bonus bp(a,ω). Since b is a positive constant, this is the 
same as just maximizing the metric p(a,ω).  
17. Since we have assumed that the military institutions guarantee a₁+...+a_{n}=r, we 
could include a cost of actions C(∑_{i=1}ⁿa_{i}) with no ill effects.  
18. Throughout the analysis we take µ as an exogenous parameter. This is done to avoid 
dealing with metric choice revealing the type of the agent; including this issue would 
convolute our main results.   
19. Assuming that the key features of the metric can be summarized by two real numbers 
avoids the complexity of a choice problem over arbitrary function spaces. Similar results 
could be derived with weaker assumptions, but the results would lose the parsimony of 
the present treatment.  
20.  For a detailed case study of the efforts to measure effects in the allied strategic 
bombing campaign in Europe, for example, see Ehlers (2009).  
21. Whether this strategy was appropriate or not is still the subject of debate. For a recent 
critique of this strategic approach, see Andrade (2008). For a brief overview of the vast 
historiography of the Vietnam War, see Hess (1994). 22. For further discussion of 
estimating the enemy order of battle, see Wirtz (1991).   
23. Beyond the problem of incentivizing the over-production of actual killing, there was 
also the problem of inflated numbers of kills being reported: “It is generally assumed that 
the body count was exaggerated: there was considerable incentive for US and South 
Vietnamese officers to err on the high side or even to fabricate wildly to impress 
superiors” (Mueller 1980: 503, see also Travis 1990). This self-reporting problem lies 
outside the current model, but bears further theoretical development.  	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